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Following the rise of tax and expenditure limitations in the 1970s, scholars have focused 
on assessing the effects of these limitations on local government fiscal outcomes. One 
key takeaway has been local governments’ decreasing reliance on property taxes and 
increased use of nontax revenue sources, in particular fees and changes. This study 
builds on this work by focusing on a particular type of fee—that is, payments in lieu of 
taxes (PILOTs). We find that, in Wisconsin, revenues received by municipalities from 
two PILOTs programs are affected quite differently. The extent to which the economy, 
municipal fiscal condition, tax and expenditure limits, and community characteristics 
affect PILOTs’ revenues depends on the extent to which the municipality can manipulate 
the payment structure. 
Keywords: Tax and Expenditure Limitations (TELs), Payments in Lieu of Taxes 
(PILOTs), Local Government Finance 
Introduction 
When compared with recent economic recessions, local governments in the United States (US) 
faced unprecedented financial difficulties during the Great Recession. Not only did local 
financial difficulties occur due to diminished sales and income tax bases from the collapse of US 
stock market prices, but also the deep housing bubble bust affected tax bases and property tax 
collections critical to most local governments (Grusky, Western, & Wimer, 2011). Further, the 
US foreclosure rate more than quadrupled from 2008 to 2009 (MBA, 2010); and, according to 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS, 2012) the US unemployment rate jumped from 4.4% to 
10.1% in 2009. At the same time, federal and state governments cut intergovernmental revenues 
and grants for ongoing public service programs during the Great Recession. Citizens’ opposition
to tax policies to overcome resource scarcity further exacerbated local fiscal challenges (Martin, 
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Levey, & Cawley, 2012). Not surprisingly, these unprecedented economic circumstances made it 
difficult for many localities to maintain public services. 
A recent study found that in the nearly 300 local governments examined in Pennsylvania, 
California, and Michigan between 2007 and 2012, more than 30% experienced some form of 
fiscal distress (Gorina, Maher, & Joffe, 2017). Consequently, these fiscal difficulties forced local 
government officials to reduce their reliance on major taxes and intergovernmental aid 
(Plerhoples & Scorsone, 2012). According to Gorina and colleagues (2017), one of the more 
frequently identified indicators of fiscal distress was an “unusual tax rate or fee increase.” 
Consistent with the theme of local governments seeking alternative revenue sources during 
periods of fiscal distress, we focus on the less studied fee: payments in lieu of taxes (PILOTs).
While considered to be an important fiscal strategy for maintaining a stable fiscal structure 
(Mayhew & Waymire, 2015), the relevance of PILOTs in the public finance literature remains 
underexplored. 
Fiscal environments and institutions are the driving forces behind fiscal choices of decision- 
makers (Hendrick, 2011). Studies show that budget decision-makers are motivated to diversify 
revenue structures for a number of reasons, including severe fiscal circumstances caused by 
economic shocks (Chaney, Copley, & Stone, 2002), community economic conditions (Garcia-
Sanchez, Mordan, & Prado-Lorenzo, 2012), and institutional constraints such as tax and
expenditure limitations (TELs) (Stallmann, Maher, Deller, & Park, 2017). Drawing on this 
framework, we develop a theoretical model to examine variation in PILOTs across Wisconsin 
municipalities. Panel data from 1997 to 2010 were collected to empirically test how fiscal 
environments and institutions affect PILOTs in Wisconsin municipalities. The period is useful 
because it captures two recessions (2001–2002 and 2007–2010) and the state’s imposition of 
two types of fiscal constraints on municipalities. In the following sections, we introduce the 
topic of PILOTs, both, in general and within Wisconsin specifically. This is followed by our 
methodology and findings. In the last section we offer a discussion and our concluding remarks.
PILOTs as a Source of Local Revenue 
Since the early 1970s, municipalities have become less reliant on property taxes and more 
reliant on fees/charges for services (see Figure 1). This shift coincides with growing resentment 
toward property tax and subsequent state efforts to limit their growth (e.g., California’s 
Proposition 13, Colorado’s Taxpayer Bill of Rights, Michigan’s Headlee Amendment, 
Massachusetts’ Proposition 2½, and Missouri’s Hancock Amendment). The subsequent increase 
in nontax revenue sources during this period is consistent with the assertion that citizens tend to 
perceive fees and charges positively in terms of the fulfillment of tax equity (Bartle, 1996). What 
is less understood is the particular types of fees and charges upon which local governments are 
becoming increasingly reliant. 
One nontax revenue source that has recently received attention is PILOTs (Mayhew & Waymire, 
2015; Fei, Hines, & Horwitz, 2016). PILOTs are intended to compensate communities for lost 
property taxes due to the tax-exempt status of the land/property (Kenyon & Langely, 2010). The 
three most common types of PILOTs are federal, utility, and nonprofit. The federal government 
(more specifically the U.S. Department of the Interior) makes PILOTs to communities to help
cover the costs of providing services on tax-exempt federal lands.1 The second type of PILOTs is 
from public or privately operated utilities (to be discussed below), and the third is from 
nonprofits that receive federal 501(c)(3) status. The latter type has recently received attention 
from scholars who are interested in the unique nature of the payment (see Longoria, 2014;  
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Figure 1. Sources of Municipal Revenues (% of General Revenues): 1972-2012 
Source: US Census Bureau, Annual Survey of State and Local Finance (2016). 
Kenyon & Langley, 2010; Lipman, 2006; Swords, 2002). These PILOTs are “voluntary payments 
made by tax exempt nonprofits as a substitute for property taxes” (Kenyon & Langley, 2011, p. 
171). The rationale for the nonprofit tax exemption falls along the lines that a) property taxes are 
based on private ownership and since nonprofits were established to benefit the public, these 
organizations should not be part of the tax base (Swords, 2002), and b) applying quid-pro-quo 
theory, nonprofits provide services that reduce public costs and, as such, are entitled to a 
subsidy (Kenyon & Langely, 2010). A counterargument to the quid-pro-quo theory is that there 
is a disconnect between the size of the exemption which is based on land value and the level of 
services provided to society by the nonprofit (Bowman, Cordes, & Matcalf, 2009). Similarly, 
Kenyon and Langely (2010) describe a geographical mismatch between the exemption and 
benefits received. Benefits provided by nonprofits spill out throughout a metropolitan area, 
state, and even nation(s), yet the exemption is concentrated in the municipality (Kenyon & 
Langely, 2010, p. 11). 
The role of tax exemptions in general and PILOTs in particular has received increased scrutiny, 
as fiscal pressures on local governments have increased (Kenyon & Langely, 2011). Interestingly, 
similar pressure has also come from the for-profit sector, which sees the exemptions as a
competitive advantage, especially for hospitals (Brody, Hammer, Henkel, Matheny, Morse, & 
McPerson, 2007). The benefits to nonprofits are substantial. In one of the few studies to 
measure the size of tax subsidies to nonprofits, Sherlock and Gravelle (2009) put the 2008–
2009 amount between $31 billion and $48 billion. While the bulk of the subsidy was in the form 
of property tax exemptions ($17–$33 billion), other tax subsidies included exemptions from 
investment income ($7–$9 billion), individual ($3.2 billion) and corporate ($0.4 billion) 
charitable contributions, inheritance tax ($0.1 billion), and sales exemptions ($3.3 billion). At
the state level, the impact of the tax loss due to nonprofit exemptions ranges from 1.5%–10%; 
however, given that nonprofits tend to be concentrated in urban areas, the impact on cities can 
be more substantial (Lipman, 2006; Kenyon & Langley, 2010). According to Lipman’s (2006) 
analysis of the 20 largest cities, the estimated value of exempt properties owned by nonprofits as 
a percentage of total property value ranged from a high of 10% in Philadelphia, PA, to a low of 
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The existing research on nonprofit PILOTs focuses on those organizations that are registered 
with the Internal Revenue Service and file Form 990. This approach seems to downplay the 
breadth of these programs, at least as they relate to Wisconsin. In 2013, 507 (26.4%) of the 
state’s municipalities reported receiving PILOTs, yet Kenyon and Langely (2010) report no 
PILOTs in the state. In fact, Wisconsin has two types of PILOTs programs that affect 
municipalities: utility PILOTs and PILOTs associated with nonprofit tax-exempt entities such as 
hospitals, government buildings and grounds, Native American-run casinos, places of worship, 
etc. Consistent with the literature on fees, one of those areas receiving attention is tax-exempt 
property. 
In Wisconsin, a state where municipalities operate under strict levy limits and there are limited 
revenue options (e.g., no sales tax) and declining intergovernmental aid, the pursuit of 
alternative revenue options has persisted. According to a 2010 survey conducted by Maher, 
Deller, and Kovari (2011), 68% of local officials were seeking increasing revenues from user fees 
and charges. Only the pursuit of grants (91%) received a higher response. In 2014, it was 
determined that there were 1,115 tax exemption filers in Wisconsin, and the total exempt 
valuation equaled $20.7 billion (State of Wisconsin, 2015). The exemptions were highest for 
religious institutions ($8.5 billion in estimated property value), followed by housing ($3.1 
billion), education ($3 billion), and medical facilities ($2.9 billion). 
The magnitude of exempt properties and the associated property tax loses have not been 
forgotten by Wisconsin municipalities. For example, communities are pushing the boundaries in 
determining what is/is not tax-exempt property. The City of Wauwatosa, WI recently tried to 
force an outpatient clinic to pay property taxes despite its affiliation with a tax-exempt hospital.2 
The case went to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, where the city lost and was forced to repay $3.5 
million on collected property taxes to Wheaton Franciscan Healthcare. The lobbying arm for 
municipalities—the League of Wisconsin Municipalities—has also conducted workshops on how 
to collect PILOTs (League of Wisconsin Municipalities, 2005). 
Milwaukee, WI generates the most from nonprofit PILOTs (approximately $1.3 million in FY 
2016).3 The city’s program, called Fair Share, is modeled after the most successful PILOTs 
program in the US (located in Boston, MA). The Fair Share program consists of city officials 
contacting each property owner who requests property tax exemption about making voluntary 
PILOTs. The city goes through the process of generating the estimated value of the tax-exempt 
property and determining a payment amount based on the tax rates for the municipality, 
county, school district, technical college, and sewerage district. Given the amount generated–
$1.3 million out of a $635 million general fund budget–the program does not come close to 
Boston’s PILOTs program (Kenyon & Langley, 2010). 
The most prominent PILOTs program in Wisconsin is municipal utilities. In Wisconsin, 
municipally owned water and electric utilities are subject to a property tax payment in lieu of 
taxes. Interestingly, the agency overseeing public utilities, the Public Service Commission (PSC), 
has been investigating the role of PILOTs for these utilities as they “…have become a substantial 
portion of the revenue requirements for municipal water utilities” (Public Service Commission, 
2013, p. 1). While utility PILOTs were established in 1918, their current form has existed since 
1955 (Public Service Commission, 2013). Between 1955 and 1985, a clear division in the taxation 
was established i.e., all privately owned utilities pay a gross receipts tax, and all municipally 
owned utilities can be charged a fee at the discretion of the local government (Public Service 
Commission, 2013). Utility PILOTs are capped “…by applying the local and school tax rates for 
the calendar year to the gross book value for the calendar year plus materials and supplies 
multiplied by the assessed ratio for the municipality involved” (Public Service Commission, 
2013, p. 3). Based on the PSC analysis, if municipally owned utilities paid a gross-receipts tax as 
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do privately owned utilities, water utilities would have paid $19.1 million in 2011, compared 
with the $92.9 million actually paid in 2011 (Public Service Commission, 2013).
The PSC analysis identified several additional relevant pieces of information. First, while utility 
PILOTs were established to reimburse local governments for services rendered, there is no 
evidence to suggest that these payments went to any other entity than municipalities. School 
districts and counties have not received any utility PILOTs payments despite the fact that school 
district tax rates are included in the PILOTs’ calculation. Second, when the PSC forwarded its 
analysis to stakeholders for input, the responses were consistent with the expectations of our 
research question. That is, local governments are increasingly reliant on these revenues 
following state-imposed TELs and oppose any change that would cut the revenue source. Local 
officials and the League of Wisconsin Municipalities (the lobbying arm for WI municipalities) 
focused their responses on current fiscal pressures faced by local governments under tax limits 
and the need to retain current revenues from utility PILOTs. According to Racine, WI Mayor 
John Dickert: 
In the 2011–13 budgets, municipalities saw extensive reductions 
in shared revenue, transportation aids, recycling funds, and road 
aids. Cities were forced to dramatically reduce everything from 
parks, libraries, community centers and basic services like Police 
and Fire protection…reductions to municipal utility PILOTs 
payments will no doubt force increases to property taxes on 
homeowners, requiring homeowners to pick up a greater share of 
the services we provide to utilities. (Public Service Commission, 
2013, appendix, p. 6) 
This quote is consistent with League of Wisconsin Municipalities response to the PCS: 
Municipal utility PILOTs should not be analyzed exclusively from 
the narrow perspective of their impact on utility rates…
Municipalities took a $100 million hit in the 2011–13 state 
budget…Most municipalities would be unable to make-up any loss 
of municipal utility PILOTs by increasing property taxes because 
of state-imposed limits. In an era of strict property tax levy limits, 
any further attempt to cut non-property tax revenue sources will 
have direct service impacts on most communities. (Public Service 
Commission, 2013, appendix, p. 4) 
Using Wisconsin municipalities as a case study, we have an opportunity to explore the 
relationship between fiscal pressures caused by the Great Recession and state-imposed TELs on 
PILOTs receipts. The analysis is based on theoretically relevant literature while offering the 
opportunity to expand our understanding of an understudied revenue source—PILOTs. In this 
study, we specifically address the following hypotheses: 
H1: Municipalities with severe economic circumstances tend to have a larger scale of 
utility PILOTs. 
H2: Municipalities with severe economic circumstances tend to have a larger scale of 
nonprofit PILOTs. 
H3: Municipalities with the restrictiveness of TELs tend to have a larger scale of utility 
PILOTs. 
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H4: Municipalities with the higher level of public demands tend to have a larger scale of 
nonprofit PILOTs 
Methodology 
Data and Sample 
To test the hypotheses, we use Wisconsin’s municipal finance data from 1997 to 2010.4 This 
period covers changes in institutional constraints and two recessions, allowing us to capture 
variation in institutional and economic events. Information on Tax and Expenditure Limitations 
(TELs) was obtained from the Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau.5 Demographic and 
socioeconomic information was collected from the American Community Survey (ACS). The 
information includes measures of community characteristics, population, aging population, 
education, income, family poverty, and unemployment rate. We combined the Wisconsin 
Financial Database with the ACS data in order to build the empirical models. The balanced 
dataset is used to control for possible biased results from the heterogeneity of cross-sectional 
units (Baltagi, 2008). 
In this study, we develop two types of empirical models: utility PILOTs and nonprofit PILOTs. 
The dataset in both models covers 14 years of Wisconsin’s incorporated municipalities—132 
cities and 140 villages that use PILOTs. In the utility model, the sample size is 3,808 including 
1,848 cities and 1,960 villages that received PILOTs payments during the study period, while the 
nonprofit model sample size is 1,232 which includes 756 cities and 476 villages. According to 
2010 census figures, the selected sample in the utility model over-represents cities (49% in 
sample vs. 32% in population) and under-represents villages (51% vs. 68%). In the nonprofit
model, cities in selected samples also are over-represented (61% in sample) and villages (39%) 
are under-represented. However, normally larger nonprofit sectors are more often located in
cities than villages. Fei, Hines Jr., and Horwitz (2016) argue that municipalities receiving 
PILOTs from nonprofits tend to be urban, heavily populated, and have populations that are 
more diverse.  
Model Specification and Variables 
For this study, we ran fixed effects regressions to examine the effects of economic 
circumstances, including community financial environment and fiscal institutions on per capita 
utility PILOTs. Due to their different structures, we constructed different models for the two
types of PILOTs in Wisconsin. The fixed effects regression model is employed to consider 
unobserved control variables that vary across municipalities and unchangeable control variables 
over time (Stock & Watson, 2012). The random effects model is used when the variation across
entities is assumed to be random and uncorrelated with independent variables included in the
nonprofit PILOTs model. The empirical models are expressed as follows: 
Utility PILOTsit = α + β1Economic circumstancesit + β2Fiscal institutionsit + β3Utility 
PILOTsit-1 + Xit + ai + dt + μit                                                   (1) 
Nonprofit PILOTsit = α + β1Economic circumstancesit + β2Public demandsit + β3Nonprofit 
PILOTsit-1   + Xit + ai + μit + it                                                  (2) 
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where, in the utility model, Utility PILOTsit is per capita utility PILOTs revenues for municipal 
government i during year t; Economic circumstancesit involve economic recession years, 
assessed value, median household income, family poverty, unemployment rate, and aging 
population rate in municipal government i during year t; Fiscal institutionsit are the 
restrictiveness of TELs in municipal government i during year t; Utility PILOTsit-1 is per capita 
utility PILOTs revenues in year t-1. Xit are control variables composed of general obligation (GO)
debt, a ratio of revenues to expenditures, intergovernmental revenues, population, and education 
levels in municipal government i during year t; ai and dt are fixed effects for municipalities and 
year, respectively; μit is the error term. In the nonprofit model, nonprofits PILOTsit is per capita 
nonprofit PILOTs revenues for municipal government i during year t; Economic circumstancesit 
involve economic recession years in municipal government i during year t; Public demandsit are
community characteristics (i.e., population, income level, non-white population, aging
population, education, family poverty, and unemployment rate); Nonprofit PILOTsit-1 is per
capita nonprofit PILOTs revenues in year t-1. Xit includes control variables composed of GO debt, 
property tax rate, and ratio of revenues to expenditures in municipal government i during year t; 
ai and μt are between-entity error; μit is within-entity error.
The dependent variables are per capita utility and per capita nonprofit PILOTs receipts.6 There 
are two approaches to measure these data per capita and the proportion of non-tax sources in 
total revenues (Carroll, 2009; Schunk & Woodward, 2005; Suyderhoud, 1994). The proportion 
of non-tax policies has been employed when considering cross-sectional municipalities with
different taxing authorities that produce variation in revenue diversification (Carroll, 2009). 
Because we are conducting a within-state analysis where there is no variation in taxing 
authority, we use the per capita PILOTs measure.  
We employ dummies during economic recessions to capture periods of fiscal strain. Declining 
stock market prices and housing values can lead to fiscal difficulties for citizens and local
governments (Grusky et al., 2011). Thus, the first key independent variable is an array of 
economic recession periods during 2001–2002 and 2007–2010. We expect the economic 
recessions to be positively associated with PILOTs. Community characteristics consist of 
assessed valuation, income, family poverty, unemployment, and aging population. Higher 
assessed values are typically associated with greater tax burdens (Ladd & Yinger, 1989); thus, 
citizens in high-valued communities should be supportive of non-tax policies including PILOTs. 
To capture ability to pay, we include median household income, family poverty, and the 
unemployment rate. Communities with less wealth tend to have less fiscal capacity and, thus, 
prefer to support the expansion of non-tax policies to achieve tax equity (Lile & Soule, 1969). We 
should expect, therefore, to find median household income negatively associated with PILOTs, 
family poverty, and unemployment rate positively associated with PILOTs. It is further argued 
that the larger the municipality’s aged population, the greater the support to expand user 
charges and fees (Jimenez, 2014).  
To measure the effects of fiscal institutions, this study uses dummy variables to capture TELs 
that can constrain municipal fiscal decisions. It has been argued that these institutions impose 
limits on fiscal discretion to levy taxes, thereby increasing local government’s reliance on non-
tax revenues (Carroll & Johnson, 2010; Blom-Hanse, Bækgaard, & Serritzlew, 2014; Stallmann 
et al., 2017). According to the Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau (2013), the State of Wisconsin 
imposed two limits during the study period. In the form of a fiscal “carrot,” The Expenditure 
Restraint Program adopted in 2003 offered a fiscal incentive to municipalities that limited 
annual growth in general-purpose expenditures (roughly 2%). The state appropriated just over 
$58 million to be divided between qualifying municipalities (the amount has not changed since 
adoption). The second TEL, adopted in 2005–2006, is much more stringent and, essentially, 
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freezes municipal levies unless there is new construction. For both programs, dummy 
variables are coded “0” for pre-TEL and “1” for post-TEL; the expected signs are positive.
Under severe conditions of resource scarcity, governments have a propensity to raise major tax 
rates and fees to maximize revenue sources (Levine, 1978). Given this theoretical expectation, 
we presume that municipalities with lower levels of fiscal health are forced to consider an array 
of fiscal choices, including whether to intitute fees/charges. Government fiscal health measures
include long-term liabilities, measured as per capita general obligation debt; budget solvency, 
measured as the ratio of operating revenues to operating expenditures; and, intergovernmental 
revenues, measured as a percentage of total general fund revenues (Nollenberger, 2003; Maher 
& Deller, 2013). The expected signs for the budgetary solvency measures are negative and for 
long-term liabilities, the expected signs are positive. Socio-demographic variables, specifically 
population and educational attainment, are also included as controls. Population and education 
are included to capture overall demand for public services, which can affect revenue choices 
(Clark, 1968; Coate & Knight, 2011; Fisher, 1996; Wolf & Amirkhanyan, 2010). High levels of 
population and education may force local governments to provide more services and obtain the 
means by which to fund those services. Note that we use the natural log of population to correct 
for the skewed distribution. Educational attainment is measured as the percentage of the 
population with a baccalaureate degree or higher. We expect population and educational 
attainment to be positively associated with PILOTs. 
Nonprofit PILOTs are generated for municipalities based on negotiations where nonprofits are 
willing to pay taxes if PILOTs revenues are spent on public services for nonprofits (Fei et al., 
2016). Nonprofits expect to mitigate fiscal difficulty from the growth of public demands by 
paying PILOTs. The magnitude of nonprofit PILOTs levies may depend on the scale of public 
demands. It is argued that municipalities with high levels of aged population and family poverty 
spend more on social welfare programs; further, educated residents and diversified 
communities tend to have greater public demands (Fei et al., 2016). In another argument, 
higher property tax rates encourage municipalities to focus their tax efforts on nonprofit PILOTs 
(Fei et al., 2016). Thus, Fei et al. (2016) construct the nonprofit PILOTs model composed of 
public demand and property tax variables. Based on this theoretical argument and model, the 
nonprofit PILOTs model entails economic crises as representing economic circumstances, and 
sociodemographic and economic information as representing public demands to determine the 
scale of nonprofit PILOTs. The expected sign of fiscal crisis is positive for nonprofit PILOTs.
We also expect that higher levels of population, income, nonwhite population, aging population, 
education, family poverty, and unemployment rate are associated with nonprofit PILOTs. One of 
the control variables—property tax rate—is included in the nonprofit PILOTs model with the 
expectation that property tax rates are positively associated with nonprofit PILOTs. Finally, 
given the incremental nature of budgeting, where current budget decisions are bounded by 
previous results of fiscal allocations (Wildavsky, 1984), we include the previous year’s PILOTs 
payment. Scholars argue that budget changes tend to be characterized by the same 
proportionate increase/decrease from year to year (Davis, Dempster, & Wildavsky, 1966; 
Lindblom, 1959; Fenno, 1973; Wildavsky, 1964). In this context, the last year’s PILOTs should 
predict the current year’s PILOTs. We include a lagged control variable in both models. A 
concern with using a lagged value as a predictor for the dependent variable is possible bias in the 
estimate (Allison, 2015; Wooldridge, 2006). Allison (2015) pointed out that some models 
including a lagged dependent variable can have endogeneity issues. We conducted the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test to assess potential endogeneity issues in the models.7 
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Figure 2. Wisconsin PILOTs Payments by Type: 1997–2010
Source: The University of Wisconsin-Extension, Local Government Center, 2012. GREAT: Graphing 
Revenues, Expenditures, and Taxes.    
Fiscal decisions may vary depending on government types that have different administrative 
goals and processes. Metropolitan governments may have more PILOTs levies than other cities 
and villages located in nonmetropolitan areas. Administrative professionals may prefer 
contracting-out in order to improve government efficiency by transferring public service 
management to nonprofits. Thus, we include government types, metropolitan governments, 
and municipalities with administrative professionals to control for the dependent variables in 
the models. The expected signs of these variables are unclear. 
Findings 
Tables 1 and 2 present the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the models. From the 
descriptive analysis, we confirm that 260 municipalities (125 cities and 135 villages) received 
PILOTs every year from utilities from 1997 to 2010; 95% of cities and 96% of villages in the 
samples received utility PILOTs. On the other hand, 41% of cities (n=54) and 24% of villages
(n=34) in the samples received PILOTs from nonprofit organizations in Wisconsin. 
In those communities that received PILOTs, the average per capita utility PILOTs payment was 
$23.80, and the average per capita nonprofit PILOTs payment was $18.40. This implies that the 
average municipality is more dependent on utility PILOTs than nonprofit PILOTs. Interesting, 
only average PILOTs payments from utilities have grown during the study period (see Figure 2). 
Average utility PILOTs payments nearly doubled during the study period, while nonprofit forms 
of PILOTs changed little. The descriptives also suggest that the average Wisconsin municipality 
is in better condition than the national average. In Wisconsin, average municipal per capita total 
general obligation debt (logged) from 1997 to 2010 was $2.95 in the utility PILOTs model and 
$2.97 in the nonprofit PILOTs model; those were less than the US average ($4.41). In terms of 
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Table 1. Descriptive Analysis Results for Utility PILOTs Model 
Variables Measurement Description Mean S. D. Min. Max. 
PILOTs Utility PILOTs Per capita utility PILOTs 23.78 14.39 0.00 329.75 
Form of Government 
City Number of cities 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Village Number of villages 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 
MSAs 
Number of metropolitan statistical 
areas 
0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Professionalism 
Presence of an administrative 
professional 




2001, 2002, 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010 





Assessed Value Per capita assessed value 61153.89 70368.52 10074.56 10401.52 
Income Level Median household income (log) 4.65 0.13 4.10 5.14 
Family Poverty 
Family below poverty level as % of 
total households 
0.07 0.05 0.00 0.39 
Unemployment 
Unemployed population as % of 
total population 
0.03 0.02 0.00 0.11 
Aging Population 
Population 65+ as % of total 
population 




Municipal expenditure restraint 
program since 2003 
0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Municipal property tax levy limit 
since 2005 
0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Control Variables 
Debt 
Per capita total general obligation 
debt (log) 
2.95 0.35 0.04 4.14 
Ratio of Revenues 
to Expenditures 
Total general revenues as % of total 
general expenditures 
0.87 0.19 0.14 2.12 
Intergovernmental 
Revenues 
Intergovernmental revenues as % 
of total general fund revenues 
0.34 0.16 0.03 0.94 
Population Population (log) 3.48 0.57 2.38 5.36 
Education 
Educational attainment 
(over bachelor’s degree) 
0.19 0.12 0.02 0.79 
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Table 2. Descriptive Analysis Results for Nonprofit PILOTs Model 
Variables Measurement Description Mean S. D. Min. Max. 
PILOTs Nonprofit PILOTs Per capita nonprofit PILOTs 18.42 20.39 0.03 190.19 
Form of Governments 
City Number of cities 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Village Number of villages 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 
MSAs 
Number of metropolitan statistical 
areas 
0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Professionalism 
Presence of an administrative 
professional 




2001, 2002, 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010 





Population Population (log) 3.59 0.54 2.51 4.93 
Income Level Median household income (log) 4.63 0.11 4.40 5.03 
Non-white 
Populations 
Non-white population as % of total 
population 
0.04 0.05 0.00 0.36 
Aging Population 
Population 65+ as % of total 
population 
0.17 0.05 0.07 0.34 
Education 
Educational attainment 
(over bachelor’s degree) 
0.18 0.11 0.04 0.78 
Family Poverty 
Family below poverty level as % of 
total households 
0.06 0.03 0.00 0.33 
Unemployment 
Unemployed population as % of 
total population 
0.03 0.01 0.00 0.08 
Control Variables 
Debt 
Per capita total general obligation 
debt (log) 
2.98 0.30 1.05 3.86 
Property Tax Rate 
General property tax receipts as % of 
assessed value of properties 
0.01 0.00 1.02 0.01 
Ratio of Revenues 
to Expenditures 
Total general revenues as % of total 
general expenditures 
0.87 0.17 0.28 1.60 
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nonprofit) was lower than the US (15.5%). This trend also extends to the unemployment rate 
(3% average in Wisconsin municipalities; 8.3% nationally). The average ratio of revenues to 
expenditures is 87%, thus reflecting the effects of two economic recessions during the study 
period. 
Table 3 provides the fixed and random effects estimation results for the utility and nonprofit 
model.8 The utility PILOTs model is statistically significant and explains 73% of  variation in the 
dependent variable. The results show that while the 2001–2002 recessions had no effect on 
PILOTs payments, the recession years from 2007–2010 had significant effects on per capita 
utility PILOTs. The Great Recession was a significant period for municipalities to extend the 
scale of utility PILOTs. There are unexpected connections between tax base variables and utility 
PILOTs. Specifically, median household income has a positive association with utility PILOTs. 
Assessed value has a positive impact on utility PILOTs, but this impact is not statistically 
significant. Utilities, as government-affiliated entities, can be controlled by municipal officials 
who can modify public service contracts. This is not the case for nonprofits since these 
organizations are not required to make these payments, which is shown in the model. The 
bureaucracy model argues that governments tend to increase public expenditures and revenues 
in order to maximize their administrative power (Niskanen, 1971). Regardless of financial 
condition, municipalities can extend their tax efforts for utility PILOTs. This may be one reason 
why the results show unexpected relationships between tax base variables and utility PILOTs. 
The fiscal condition of a municipality, measured in terms of intergovernmental aid and debt, 
affected PILOTs payments. Municipalities with more debt and less state aid received higher 
utility payments. Contrary to our expectations, however, the imposition of levy limits is 
negatively associated with utility PILOTs. The results generally support our expectation that 
municipalities, when faced with fiscal challenges, seek to increase per capita PILOTs.  
Among the community characteristics variables, in the utility PILOTs model there are few 
signficant results. First, median income levels are significantly associated with per capita utility 
PILOTs, but only marginally and the expected sign is in the opposite direction. The other 
variables (assessed valuation, family poverty, unemployment, and aging population) were not 
statistically associated with the dependent variable. The variable that does seem to matter is the 
prior year’s utility payment. It, thus, appears that the incremental budgeting process is also 
reflected in utility PILOTs. 
On the fiscal institution side, the adoption of the property tax levy limit program in 2005 has a 
negative effect on utility PILOTs payments. This result is inconsistent with our expectation that 
the restrictiveness of fiscal institutions is positively associated with the scale of utility PILOTs.9 
Given the highly politicized nature of TELs, one possible explanation is that with the adoption of 
levy limits in 2005 local governments sought to shift service costs away from the levy, including 
the utility property tax. It was not until the 2007 recession that these same municipalities were 
forced to increase levies on utilities. 
The nonprofit PILOTs model is statistically significant and explains 40% of the variation in the 
dependent variable. The findings, however, are quite different from those of the utility model. 
In fact, the only variables that are associated with nonprofit PILOTs are the lagged dependent 
variable and debt. Both variables are significant and positive. The sign of the lagged dependent 
variable suggests that there is an incremental process that occurs with nonprofit PILOTs similar 
to other budgeting practices. The lack of statistical significance also suggests that nonprofit 
PILOTs were unaffected by recessions, fiscal conditions, or most community characteristics. 
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Constant 0.51 31.84 
N 3535 1134 
F/Wald Chi2 185.66 21184.37 
R2 (within) 0.73 0.39 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; two-tailed test
Note(s): Based on Hausman test results, we conducted a fixed effects analysis for the utility PILOTs model 
and a random effects analysis for the nonprofit PILOTs model. The government type, metropolitan 
government, and professionalism variables are automatically dropped in the utility PILOTs model results 
because the fixed effects estimation does not consider unchangeable control variables. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
This study expanded the exploration of payments in lieu of taxes (PILOTs) both in terms of
model specification and PILOTs types. Using Wisconsin municipalities as the units of analysis, 
we studied municipal PILOTs’ receipts in light of economic and demographic circumstances, 
institutional constraints, and public demands. To test our hypotheses, we constructed fixed 
effects and random effects regression models for two types of PILOTs, one for utilities and 
another for tax-exempt properties (e.g., nonprofit hospitals and care facilities, government 
buildings and properties, and places of worship). When comparing the two models, the findings 
are quite distinct. The model of utility PILOTs payments is more consistent with our hypotheses 
than those for nonprofit PILOTs. In fact, we found few variables associated with nonprofit 
PILOTs payments. 
Our findings suggest that 1) all PILOTs are not alike and their different characteristics warrant 
further examination, and 2) political backlash from seeking payments from tax-exempt entities 
e.g., places of worship and hospitals, may be much greater than simply changing the
reimbursement rate from tax-exempt public utilities. Regarding the former, municipalities have 
some discretion in their collection of utility PILOTs given that factors such as estimated facility 
valuation, the inclusion/exclusion of other forms of government such as counties and school, 
can be adjusted by municipalities. Furthermore, the quotes included in the study demonstrate a 
clear understanding by local leaders that this fiscal instrument is a tool for helping to cope with 
fiscal pressures. Conversely, nonprofit PILOTs require the agreement by nonprofit leaders to 
voluntarily make these payments. Municipal leaders have limited leverage and there is little 
incentive for nonprofits to make these payments regardless of the fiscal, economic or 
demographic pressures facing the community. What seems to matter is an historical 
commitment to creating nonprofit PILOTs. The lagged dependent variable strongly suggests 
that past commitments by nonprofits to municipalities are the basis for continued 
commitments. 
The first point above cannot be overstated. One of the greatest challenges in conducting this 
work is creating conceptual definitions. The current body of literature suggests that PILOTs are 
specific to nonprofits. This is simply not the case, as we have shown here. This matters because 
the determining factors associated with PILOTs vary by type. Similarly, the operational 
definition of nonprofits needs refinement, at least when studied within the context of PILOTs. 
Nonprofit PILOTs tend to be associated with specific types of organizations, e.g., hospitals and 
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universities (Kenyon & Langley, 2010). The ability to separate out these types of organizations
in future PILOTs studies will be important. 
Our findings and those by others raise some important operational questions—especially since 
every identified study to date, including ours, is from the perspective of local government.
Nonprofit PILOTs are entirely voluntary, and identifying the rationale for nonprofit leasers to 
make such payments (e.g., Is it coercive? Truly voluntary? Or somewhere in between?) may go a 
long way toward our understanding of just how important a role these revenues can play in local 
budgeting. 
Data limitations for this study are noted. We were unable to capture the political environment at 
the local level, other than TELs adoption. Second, given the nature of the research design, the 
generalizability of the findings is limited to Wisconsin municipalities. These limitations can be 
addressed in future research. Given the limited research on PILOTs, we view this study as 
exploratory in hopes that it draws interest to a topic that has the potential for far-reaching 
consequences both practically and theoretically. 
Notes 
1. The major purpose of PILOTs is to financially offset the loss of property taxes from
federal tax exemptions (see, US Department of the Interior, Payments in Lieu of Taxes.
Retrieved from https://www.doi.gov/pilt)
2. It has been suggested that there is an issue where local governments are concerned with
the fiscal loss of tax exempt lands and facilities such as hospitals. (See for instance, Foley
and Lardner LLP. “Wisconsin Supreme County Concludes Offsite Hospital Operated
Outpatient Clinic Is Exempt from Property Tax.” Retrieved from https://www.foley.com/
intelligence/detail.aspx?int=7901)
3. We obtain this information from the following website
http://city.milwaukee.gov/ImageLibrary/User/pmensa/2016CAFRFinalforPrint.pdf. 
City of Milwaukee, WI, Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for Year Ended 
December 31, 2016.
4. The data were made available from the University of Wisconsin-Extension’s Local
Government Center and are available at the following site
http://lgc.uwex.edu/topics/great-graphing-revenues-expenditures-and-taxes-software/
5. The following website offers information on tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) in
the State of Wisconsin
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/misc/lfb/informational_papers/january_2017/0012_l
ocal_government_expenditure_and_revenue_limits_informational_paper_12.pdf.
Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau, Informational Papers # 12, 2017.
6. Wisconsin utilities are municipally-owned and are regulated by the Public Service
Commission (PSC). Thus, the utilities are treated as enterprise funds and the ability to
transfer funds to governmental funds is restricted by the state and PSC.
7. The utility and nonprofit models include lagged per capita PILOTs variables. The
Durbin-Wu-Hausman values are 0.04 (p=0.84) in the utility PILOTs model, and 1.21
(p=0.27) in the nonprofit PILOTs model. Based on these results, neither model is
concerned with endogeneity issues.
8. Our models and data do not violate regression assumptions. First, both models do not
have any serious multicollinearity issues (VIF=1.04–4.38 and 1.06–7.17). Second, the
results of a Hausman test, controlling for municipality fixed effects, is appropriate for the
utility model and panel data (X2=150.29; p<0.00). However, the result of Hausman in
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the nonprofit PILOTs data shows that the random effects model is more suitable 
(X2=18.85; p=0.28). 
9. To test the robustness of these results, we used a different approach to separate TEL 
effects from economic recessions and ran the following models: a) with binary TEL and 
economic recession variables, b) with no economic recession dummies, and c) TELs 
counters. The results consistently showed negative associations between the property tax 
limit program and utility PILOTs.
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